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This paper surveys the recent development of empirical and theo-
retical researches on incomplete markets, pointing out the following
aspects. First, the theoretical study in this field is motivated by
empirical findings of both asset pricing anomalies and heterogenous
behavior among economic agents. Second, incomplete insurance
combined with either borrowing constraints or transaction costs offers
predictions consistent with empirical findings. In addition, the 
failure of insuring persistent or permanent shocks alone yields empir-
ically reasonable predictions. Third, recent theoretical research 
has made attempts to endogenize incomplete insurance from first
principles. Fourth, incomplete markets may make aggregate shocks
distributed disproportionately among agents, thereby having a signif-
icant impact on dynamic allocation and pricing. Finally, the 
theoretical research into incomplete markets triggers a reassessment 
of welfare implications as to business cycles, economic growth, and
financial integration.
Key words: Incomplete markets; Asset pricing46 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999
I. Introduction
One of the most important implications of complete markets is that idiosyncratic
shocks are shared efficiently among agents. Idiosyncratic shocks may be specific 
to persons, families, workplaces, industries, or regions in a domestic economy, and
particular as to countries in international contexts. Sharing idiosyncratic shocks
among heterogeneous consumers implies two immediate theoretical consequences.
First, the consumption behavior becomes similar among consumers. In particular, 
the individual consumption grows at similar rates. Second, consumers demand a
moderate premium in exchange for holding risky assets because they are able to
diversify both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks in complete markets.
Empirical research, however, shows that these two predictions are violated pro-
foundly by observations. On the one hand, the asset pricing literature frequently
finds that risk premia observed in financial markets are far larger than ones predicted
by the complete market framework. On the other hand, panel data studies often
observe a substantial heterogeneity in the consumption behavior among individuals.
All the macroeconomic and microeconomic evidence suggests that idiosyncratic
shocks are not shared efficiently in markets, and that individuals fail to diversify risks.
Recent research into incomplete markets is motivated by the above observation of
both asset pricing anomalies and heterogeneous consumption behavior.
This paper surveys empirical and theoretical research on incomplete markets 
with the following emphasis. First, the paper briefly reviews empirical methods to test
market completeness within the representative agent framework. In addition, it 
surveys the recent empirical research which tests predictions specific to incomplete
markets using macroeconomic and microeconomic data, and in particular, explores
how the Euler equation deviates in the absence of completeness.
Second, the paper examines two channels through which incompleteness does
matter in affecting dynamic allocation and pricing. One class of theoretical models
considers incomplete insurance or the failure of insuring idiosyncratic shocks in 
markets. In this class of models, main topics include how the nature of idiosyncratic
shocks affects asset pricing and how financial frictions such as borrowing constraints
and transaction costs limit the ability of self-insurance. The other class takes into
consideration how incompleteness causes aggregate shocks to be distributed dispro-
portionately among different agents. The concentration of aggregate shocks on a 
subset of the entire population often yields predictions which are fairly different 
from the complete market framework. In addition, at more fundamental levels,
recent theoretical research has made attempts to endogenize incomplete markets from
first principles.
Finally, the paper studies how the welfare assessment of macroeconomic perfor-
mance is influenced in the absence of completeness. In particular, two topics are 
discussed: costs of business cycles and welfare implications of economic growth. The
welfare evaluation as to both business cycles and economic growth quite often differs
substantially between an economy with complete markets and one without them.
Another topic is how welfare distribution changes when an economy moves from
less-complete markets to more complete ones.47
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This paper is organized as follows. Chapter II discusses empirical research, and
Chapter III deals with theoretical research. Chapter IV examines welfare implications
of incomplete markets. Chapter V presents the conclusion.
II. Empirical Research
When markets are complete, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution 
(hereafter, IMRS) is equalized among agents. The aggregation theorem exploits 
this equality of the IMRS among consumers, and allows one to construct a 
representative agent from heterogeneous consumers. Therefore, testing the represen-
tative agent framework using aggregate data serves as a starting point for examining
market completeness.
A. Aggregation Theorem
First of all, this section briefly reviews the aggregation theorem. Suppose that 
a market exists for every possible state, and that a contingent claim for state w(t) 
at time t is traded at the price p(w(t)) when an economy starts at time 0. Agent i
maximizes the following lifetime expected utility at time 0: 
¥ 1 å ———  å.  (p(w(t))u(ci(w(t))))





åå .   p(w(t))(ei(w(t)) + di(w(t)) – ci(w(t))) = 0,
t=0 w(t)ÎW(t)
where r is the rate of time preference, W(t) denotes a set of all states at time t,
p(w(t)) is the objective unconditional probability that state w(t) takes place at time t,
and u is the time-additive and state-independent period utility. u' (ci(w(t))) > 0 and
u'' (ci(w(t))) < 0 are assumed. ci,  ei, and di indexed by state w(t) imply agent i’s 
consumption, exogenous income, and transfer from other consumers at state 
w(t), respectively.
Assuming that li is the Lagrange multiplier for agenti’s lifetime budget constraint,
and deriving the first-order condition with respect to agent i’s  w(t)-consumption, 
we obtain
1 —— — p(w(t))u' (ci(w(t))) = lip(w(t)). (1)
(1 + r)
tThe above first-order condition (1) with the concavity of the utility function 
leads to the result that individual consumption increases monotonically in aggregate
consumption, or ci(w(t)) = fi(C(w(t))), with f i'(C(w(t))) > 0 where C(w(t)) =
åici(w(t)) (see Wilson [1968] and Huang and Litzenberger [1988]). Restating this
result, individual consumption is influenced by only aggregate shocks which appear
at the macroeconomic level. This analytical consequence sheds light on the ability of
complete markets to perfectly insure idiosyncratic shocks.
It is possible to derive from equation (1) the equality of the marginal rate of 
substitution (MRS) between two different states among consumers. That is, taking
two states w(t) and w(t +1) for example, we obtain, after cancelling out the Lagrange
multipliers li and lj, 
1     u' (ci(w(t + 1)))      1    u' (cj(w(t + 1))) —— ————— — = —— ————— —   " i and j. (2)
1 + r    u' (ci(w(t))) 1 + r    u' (cj(w(t)))
In addition, as Rubinstein (1974) shows, when the utility function u belongs to
the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion family (the HARA family), the MRS evaluated
at individual consumption is equal to that evaluated at aggregate consumption, or
1    u' (ci(w(t + 1)))      1    u' (C(w(t + 1))) —— ————— — = —— ————— —   " i, (3)
1 + r    u' (ci(w(t))) 1 + r    u' (C(w(t)))
where  C(w(t)) = åici(w(t)). The above equation (3) lays the foundation for a 
representative agent model as a reasonable approximation to the complete market
economy with multiple agents. As shown below, the empirical examination of market
completeness is carried out by testing either empirical specifications based on 
equation (2) using microeconomic data or specifications derived from equation 
(3) using macroeconomic data.
B. Tests of Capital Asset Pricing Models
The construction of a representative agent relies on the assumption of market 
completeness; therefore, testing implications available from the representative agent
framework can serve as a statistical investigation as to whether markets are complete.
The most typical way is to estimate the following form of Euler equation defined on
aggregate consumption C(t): 
1                       u' (C(t + 1))     ——Et   R(t, t + 1)———— —   = 1, (4)
1 + r   ( u' (C(t))   )
where Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on information available as of
time t, and R(t, t + 1) implies the holding real gross return on a financial asset
between time t and t + 1. Rubinstein (1974) shows that it is possible to rigorously
derive equation (4) from equation (3).
48 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999The existing literature often assumes the constant relative risk aversion preference
(hereafter, the CRRA preference) for a utility function of a representative agent as a
reference case, while heterogeneous agents can be replaced by a representative agent
under a wide class of time-additive utility functions.
1 That is, u(C ) = C
1–g/(1 – g),
where g is the degree of relative risk aversion. Hence, estimating equation (4) corre-
sponds to testing a joint hypothesis of a particular functional form of utility as 
well as market completeness. In this context, market incompleteness is not the 
whole reason for the rejection of equation (4), but a likely candidate for the interpre-
tation of the rejection.
2 We will later explore empirical implications more specific to
market incompleteness.
1. GMM estimation
A typical estimation procedure for the above Euler equation (4) is the generalized
method of moments (hereafter, GMM) proposed by Hansen (1982). According to
the GMM estimation result using U.S. financial data,
3 two aspects are inconsistent
with theoretical implications. First, estimated parameters are frequently out of a 
reasonable range; the estimated time preference is often negative, while the degree of
relative risk aversion is close to zero or negative. Second, while the forecast error of
the estimated Euler equation should not include any predictable components under
the null hypothesis, the failure of overidentifying restrictions indicates that forecast
errors can be predicted by the current information set. These two findings imply that
the representative agent framework with the CRRA preference fails to account for
U.S. macroeconomic data.
2. Calibration methods
Empirical results based on calibration methods are also unfavorable to the prediction
of the representative agent framework. A main idea of calibration methods is to 
simulate a fully specified general equilibrium version of a representative agent model, 
and to compare simulated moments with observed moments. Specifying a set 
of moments under consideration, this method is helpful for checking in which
dimension the representative agent framework does not work very well.
The study by Mehra and Prescott (1985) is a first example of testing the represen-
tative agent model by a calibration method. Their simulation model is an application
of Lucas (1978). Adopting the CRRA preference, they specify as a target the uncon-
ditional mean of both the equity premium and the risk-free rate. According to their
investigation of U.S. financial data, the observed average of the equity premium is far
larger than the average predicted by their representative agent model, while the
observed average of a risk-free rate is much smaller than the theoretical prediction.
49
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1. Using demand aggregation, Rubinstein (1974) shows that if a utility function belongs to the HARA family, then 
a representative agent can be constructed. Constantinides (1982) proves that the capital asset pricing model can 
be expressed in terms of only aggregate variables under time-additive utility functions with homogeneous beliefs.
The assumption about utility functions adopted by Constantinides is weaker than that adopted by Rubinstein in
aggregating demand.
2. Careful readings of the literature indicate that the estimation of the Euler equation using macroeconomic data 
was not motivated initially by a desire to test market completeness. The main motivation was to examine whether
the risk aversion behavior is responsible for the rejection of the efficient market hypothesis which assumes risk
neutrality. See Leroy (1989).
3. The empirical study by Hansen and Singleton (1982) is a seminal work in this field. Singleton (1990) provides an
excellent survey on the GMM estimation of the Euler equation.Mehra and Prescott themselves call the former inconsistency the equity premium
puzzle, and Weil (1989) calls the latter the risk-free rate puzzle.
One main source of these puzzles is that the aggregate consumption growth
observed in developed countries including the United States is fairly smooth, and its
variance is too small to yield empirically reasonable magnitudes of equity premia and
risk-free rates. Mehra and Prescott (1985) set up a clear criterion for the appropriate-
ness of a certain class of asset pricing model; a reasonable model should help to
resolve the above puzzles. The subsequent literature also offers a statistical metric
between simulated moments and observed ones.
4
3. Hansen-Jagannathan method
The model evaluation method proposed by Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) is simi-
lar to the calibration method in spirit. But, the above method, without fully specify-
ing a general equilibrium model, offers a test based on much weaker restrictions than
does the calibration method; therefore, the violation of the Hansen-Jagannathan
restriction means a much stronger rejection of the model under consideration.
The main idea of the Hansen-Jagannathan method is summarized as follows.
Suppose that m(t, t +1) denotes the IMRS which discounts one period ahead finan-
cial payoffs (˜ R(t, t + 1), which is a vector of financial returns) at time t. m(t, t +1 )
should be constructed such that the following unconditional expectation version of
Euler equation may hold: 
1                       ——E(
˜ R(t, t +1)m(t, t +1)) = ˜ 1, (5)
1 + r   
where E implies the unconditional expectation operator, and ˜ 1 is a unit vector. 
In equation (4), therefore, m(t, t + 1) corresponds to u' (C(t + 1))/u' (C(t)). A vital 
part of this method is to assume that m(t, t + 1) can be approximated by a linear
combination of observed  ˜ R(t, t +1)’s, as
m(t, t +1) = constant +  ˜ R(t, t +1) 'a + error terms, (6)
where a’s are coefficients of a linear regression.
Since m(t, t + 1) is not directly observable by nature, it is impossible to estimate
a’s to exactly recover a systematic part of m(t, t + 1). It is, however, possible to
impose some restrictions on the unconditional moments of m(t, t + 1) such that
equations (5) and (6) may be satisfied at the same time. Hansen and Jagannathan
derive the lower bound for Var(m(t, t + 1)), which corresponds to the variance of a
systematic part of equation (6), given a certain level of E(m(t, t +1)).
Using U.S. macroeconomic data, Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), Cochrane and
Hansen (1992), and others find that the mean and variance of the IMRS based on
the CRRA preference are far outside the region implied by the Hansen-Jagannathan
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4. See Duffie and Singleton (1993). Heaton (1995) applies the simulated method of moments to the estimation of
non-time-separable preference.method. These results suggest a much stronger rejection of the representative 
agent model with the CRRA preference than does the Mehra and Prescott type 
calibration method.
5
4. Extension of representative agent models
As mentioned before, the failure of representative agent models is caused by either
the misspecification of utility functional forms or the absence of complete markets.
Before pursuing as a major topic the latter possibility in the rest of this chapter, we
briefly discuss the former possibility.
Keeping the complete market assumption intact, the literature extends representa-
tive agent models in three directions.
6 First, time-nonseparability is introduced 
into the preference formulation. Constantinides (1990) shows that taking into 
consideration habit formation yields a reasonable magnitude of equity premia using a
continuous-time asset pricing model. Abel (1990) and Campbell and Cochrane
(1995) also introduce consumption externality, thereby yielding predictions similar
to the habit formation model. Heaton (1993), Ferson and Constantinides (1991),
and others statistically test whether asset pricing models are improved by considering
habit and durability using U.S. aggregate data.
Second, the notion of non-expected utility is exploited. Epstein and Zin (1989)
adopt non-expected utility in defining asset pricing models. Epstein and Zin (1991)
estimate the Euler equation based on their non-expected utility model using U.S.
financial data; their estimation result is a little mixed and quite sensitive to the choice
of instrumental variables. Third, catastrophic events such as the Great Depression are
treated explicitly in specifying a stochastic environment. Using calibration methods,
Reitz (1998), Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (1993), and others find that large equity
premia are predicted by asset pricing models with catastrophic events.
C. Tests of Insurance Using Microeconomic Data
1. Full insurance hypothesis
Testing microeconomic implications using equation (2) is another way to examine
market completeness, and offers more direct evidence for whether markets are 
complete. As first pointed out by Townsend (1987), a striking feature of equation 
(2) is that it holds for any realized state as long as contingent claims are available for
all possible states. Under the null hypothesis of complete markets, hence, equation
(2) imposes rather tight restrictions on the realized path of individual consumption.
More concretely, the realized consumption growth is exactly equal among 
consumers under the CRRA utility (u(c) = c
1 – g/(1 – g)). That is, 
ln ci(w(t +1)) – ln ci(w(t)) = ln cj(w(t +1)) – ln cj(w(t))  " i and j. (7)
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5. The subsequent development of the Hansen-Jagannathan method considers statistical inferences (Hansen,
Heaton, and Luttmer [1995]).
6. Kocherlakota (1996) systematically surveys attempts to resolve the equity premium puzzle and the risk-free 
rate puzzle. Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) offer a comprehensive assessment of the recent econometric
development in this field.Similarly, the first difference in consumption is equalized among consumers under
the constant absolute risk aversion preference (u(c) = –1/sexp(–sc), hereafter, the
CARA preference): 
ci(w(t +1)) – ci(w(t)) = cj(w(t +1)) – cj(w(t)) " i and j. (8)
Given more desirable features of the CRRA utility in the uncertainty context (see
Huang and Litzenberger [1988]), the CRRA preference is often preferred to the
CARA preference in empirical practice. Following such practice, this paper mostly
focuses on the case with the CRRA preference.
Exploiting the aggregation theorem, Mace (1991) and others derive from 
equation (3) with the CRRA preference the following alternative specification for
testing full insurance: 
ln ci(w(t +1)) – ln ci(w(t)) = lnC(w(t +1)) – lnC(w(t)) " i. (9)
The above equation throws a clear light on the implication that the individual
consumption growth is determined by only a common factor, or the aggregate 
consumption growth.
Examining empirical implications such as equations (7), (8), and (9) provides a
simple but powerful tool for a test of complete markets or full insurance. Specifically,
such an examination tests whether individual consumption growth is influenced 
by a common time-specific factor (the aggregate consumption growth) or by 
person-specific factors. In transforming these theoretical implications into statistical
relationships, researchers usually introduce either measurement errors or individual
preference shocks as statistical error terms.
2. Panel data study
While many empirical papers test full insurance implicitly as pointed out by Hayashi
(1987), more and more papers have conducted an explicit test of full insurance using
U.S. panel data. The examples using the Panel Study Income Dynamics (PSID)
include Altug and Miller (1990), Cochrane (1991), Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff
(1992), McCarthy (1995), and Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996), while those
using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) include Mace (1991) and Nelson
(1991). In addition, Townsend (1994, 1995), and others examine household panel
data from developing countries.
Overall, empirical results reject full insurance. Careful readings of these results
illuminate how full insurance is rejected. While Mace (1991) is in favor of full 
insurance, Nelson (1994) points out that the result of Mace is sensitive to a more
accurate measurement of consumption and employment. Cochrane (1991) shows
that individual consumption grows more slowly in response to long illness and 
involuntary job loss.
McCarthy (1995) demonstrates that the relevance of full insurance differs
between high-wealth and low-wealth households. Altonji et al. (1992) analyze 
family risk-sharing explicitly. While Altug and Miller (1990) argue that ignoring
nonseparability of utility in consumption and leisure is responsible for the rejection
52 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999of full insurance under separability, Hayashi et al. (1996) construct a test such that it
has a statistical power against self-insurance as an alternative, thereby rejecting full
insurance even under nonseparability.
3. Differentiation between full insurance and self-insurance
Even in the absence of a full set of contingent claims, consumers are still able to 
self-insure income fluctuation to some extent by saving and dissaving in financial 
and physical assets. Under the self-insurance hypothesis, the following Euler equation
still holds at the individual level: 
1                       u' (ci(t +1))     ——Et   R(t, t +1)————   = 1 " i. (10)
1 + r   ( u' (ci(t))   )
One thing to be noticed immediately is that equation (10) is a much weaker
restriction than is equation (2). Accepting equation (10) cannot rule out rejecting
equation (2) at all. A typical way to statistically test equation (10) using panel data 
is to predict a component of idiosyncratic shocks to individual resources which are
realized between time t and t +1 using the time t information set as an instrument,
and to examine whether the one-period-ahead forecast error of the Euler equation is
correlated with such a predictable (instrumented) component.
7 More concretely, 
taking for example a change in individual wages between time t and t +1(Dwi(t +1)),
the above test consists of first instrumenting Dwi(t + 1) by Dwi(t) and other current
variables, and second testing whether the realized forecast error between time t and
time t +1 is correlated with this anticipated component of Dwi(t +1).
Given the above empirical procedure, the absence of the correlation between the
forecast error of the Euler equation and the idiosyncratic resource shock anticipated
by the current information set supports the self-insurance hypothesis, but not 
necessarily the full insurance hypothesis. Emphasizing this difference, Hayashi 
et al. (1996) propose to include not only the current information but also the 
future information in the set of instrumental variables, to differentiate full insurance 
from self-insurance. 
In addition, testing the self-insurance using aggregate data calls for due caution.
As discussed in the previous section, the failure of complete markets leads to the 
failure of the Euler equation defined on aggregate consumption (equation [4]).
Hence, incomplete markets or the failure of full insurance is a likely candidate for the
interpretation of the rejection of equation (4) by aggregate data.
The rejection of equation (4), however, does not necessarily imply that of equa-
tion (10). There is still room for equation (10) to be satisfied at the individual level as
far as the self-insurance hypothesis holds. Let us follow Attanasio and Weber (1993)
to illuminate this point. As Hall (1988) demonstrates, assuming the CRRA utility
and linearly expanding equation (4) up to a low order, we obtain
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7. Hall (1978) is a seminal paper which first proposed such a test for the self-insurance, although his empirical exercise
did not use microeconomic data but macroeconomic data.1 lnC(t +1) – lnC(t) = constant + –(R(t, t +1) – r) + error term. (11) g
The same expression is available from equation (10) for the individual level: 
1 lnci(t +1) – lnci(t) = constant + –(R(t, t +1) – r) + error term " i. g
Summing the above equation over all consumers leads to 




where  I denotes the number of consumers. Notice that the error term of 
equation (12) includes only aggregate shocks because idiosyncratic shocks are 
averaged out.
When full insurance holds, we obtain 1/I åi(ln ci(t +1) – ln ci(t)) = lnC(t +1) – 
ln C(t) from equation (3), and the above two Euler equations (11) and (12) hold 
at the same time. When full insurance fails but self-insurance holds, however, 
1/I åi(ln ci(t + 1) – ln ci(t)) is no longer equal to ln C(t + 1) – ln C(t), and only 
the latter Euler equation (12) holds. Attanasio and Weber (1993) argue that, 
when the self-insurance hypothesis is tested by the aggregate-level specification, 
the left-hand side of the former Euler equation (ln C(t + 1) – ln C(t)) should be
replaced by 1/I åi(ln ci(t + 1) – ln ci(t)) to consider the consumption heterogeneity
due to market incompleteness.
4. Liquidity constraints
Liquidity constraints keep consumers from financing current consumption, and 
limit the ability of consumers to self-insure income fluctuation. In this sense, it 
is crucially important for the possibility of liquidity constraints to be taken into 
consideration. The literature on liquidity constraints is, on the other hand, 
extremely large; therefore, in what follows we will discuss only issues viewed as 
relevant from the perspective of this paper. Hayashi (1987), Deaton (1992), and
Attanasio (1995) offer a comprehensive survey on theoretical and empirical studies 
of liquidity constraints.
The most important empirical implication of liquidity constraints is that 
the Euler equation (10) fails to hold at the individual level. More specifically, 
the individual consumption growth is steeper than that implied by the optimal 
allocation, and the left-hand side of the Euler equation is smaller than one (e.g., see
Deaton [1991]): 
54 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 19991      u' (ci(t +1))     ——Et R(t, t +1)————  ≤ 1.
1 + r   ( u' (ci(t))   )
Zeldes (1989a) empirically explores the above implication as to the deviation of
the Euler equation using microeconomic panel data.
8 He finds that the Euler equa-
tion does not hold for a fraction of the population, in particular for low-wealth
households. Runkle (1991), however, presents the empirical results which are quite
different from those of Zeldes (1989a).
9
The evidence for liquidity constraints, or the empirical rejection of the Euler
equation at the individual level, gives rise to somewhat acute tension in regard to
which model to consider first in empirical practice. If not only full insurance but 
also self-insurance fails to hold, researchers are forced to give up tight theoretical
restrictions such as equations (2) and (10) in specifying empirical relationships.
There may be three responses to the possibility of liquidity constraints. 
First, one may explicitly solve for an equilibrium of the economy with neither full
insurance nor self-insurance. Since there is no closed-form solution in most cases, a
wide array of numerical simulation techniques are adopted as a means of solving
models. Several examples for this approach will be discussed in Chapter III.
Second, one may want to consider the case where liquidity constraints are binding 
(the self-insurance hypothesis fails to hold) but contingent claims are available for all 
possible states (markets are complete). One twist here is that this approach is still able to
exploit the aggregation property due to the assumption of complete markets. Thanks 
to this, the liquidity constraint at the individual level yields some empirical implications
for aggregate data. Following the above approach, He and Modest (1995) and
Luttmer (1996) impose the Hansen-Jagannathan (1991) type restriction on aggregate data
for the case where individual consumers are subject to liquidity constraints.
10
Third, it may be fair to point out at this moment that some theoretical considera-
tions still make the self-insurance hypothesis the reasonable and powerful approxi-
mation of consumption behavior. As Hayashi (1987) discusses, when the utility level
at zero consumption is substantially low, consumers arrange their consumption plans
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8. Hayashi (1985a) explores the possibility of liquidity constraints by estimating a consumption function using U.S.
cross-sectional data.
9. Runkle (1991) suggests that either Zeldes’ usage of family-specific dummies, the statistical inference about the
moving-average error structure, or a difference in sample periods is responsible for the difference in the empirical results.
10. More concretely, He and Modest (1995) assume the following notion of a liquidity constraint, called a market




where Rt(w(t)) is the time t payoff in the subsequent time periods of the entire portfolio (including financial,
physical, and human assets) constructed at time t. Other notations are the same as ones in the main text. The
above constraint implies that the present value of the consumer’s portfolio must be non-negative. Luttmer
(1996), on the other hand, uses a stronger notion of a liquidity constraint, called a solvency constraint, as follows: 
Rt(w(t)) ³ 0,
for any state in the future. That is, any portfolio that includes debt in some future states is prohibited.such that the zero or negative consumption state may be avoided; consequently, 
liquidity constraints may be never binding in optimal consumption plans. In 
addition, by simulation, Zeldes (1989b) presents the case where zero consumption is
avoided along the optimal consumption path under the CRRA preference. In what
follows, this paper will take this line of theoretical reasoning at some points, and 
consider the self-insurance hypothesis as one of the reasonable assumptions.
5. Cross-sectional data study
One of the most serious problems empirical researchers often face in testing either
full insurance or self-insurance is that it is extremely hard to obtain high-quality
panel data. In the case of the United States, for example, the PSID traces the 
same individual for long periods, but it records only food consumption. This data
restriction makes it impossible to test equations (2) and (10) using natural definitions
of consumption such as nondurable and service expenditures.
To overcome this problem, Deaton and Paxson (1994) propose to explore the
cross-sectional implication of equation (10) using the consumption inequality measure
within the same cohort. Their idea is simple but appealing. As persistent or permanent
uninsured shocks hit upon individual resources and are accumulated over time, the
cross-sectional dispersion of consumption within a fixed cohort should grow with
age. When idiosyncratic shocks are pooled in insurance markets, on the contrary, the
within-cohort consumption inequality should be flat with respect to age.
Ohtake and Saito (1998a) demonstrate that the variance of logarithmic con-
sumption serves as the exact within-cohort inequality measure which is theoretically 
consistent with equation (10) with the CRRA preference. In addition, Deaton and
Paxson (1994) and Ohtake and Saito (1998a) argue that the comparison between the
within-cohort inequality of consumption and that of disposable income enables one
to test a simple version of liquidity constraints where the current consumption is
equal to the current disposable income.
Deaton and Paxson (1994) indeed find that the consumption inequality grows
quickly with age within a fixed cohort using the cross-sectional data of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Taiwan. Their findings suggest that a large com-
ponent of idiosyncratic shocks is not shared efficiently in the insurance markets of
these countries. Ohtake and Saito (1998a) add the case of Japan to the list of the 
evidence for the failure of full insurance.
6. Lacking in diversification of financial assets
Casual observations indicate that not only idiosyncratic shocks but also aggregate
shocks fail to be shared among the entire population in markets. Because investors
and consumers can diversify portfolios in complete markets, such observations 
present evidence against complete markets.
11 Several household studies, including
Avery, Elliehausen, and Kennickell (1988), find that a substantial fraction of 
households fail to diversify financial assets efficiently and keep holding conservative
and safe portfolios, while a fairly small portion of the population holds most shares of
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11. One caveat here is that the diversification of financial portfolios does not necessarily imply complete markets.
Even if there are no insurance markets for idiosyncratic shocks, investors and consumers could control aggregate
risks (market risks) by portfolio diversification.risky assets such as corporate equities. These findings suggest that aggregate shocks—
both capital gains and losses—concentrate on the limited number of households that
hold equities and other risky assets in their portfolio.
The above evidence for the absence of portfolio diversification dramatically 
contradicts the theoretical implication of asset pricing models which underlie the 
representative agent framework as well as self-insurance. In theory, consumers 
have a strong incentive to earn higher average returns by diversifying aggregate 
risks. In practice, however, many households miss such investment opportunities 
for some reasons. 
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) demonstrate that the fact that many households do not
hold equity shares is responsible for the failure of the representative agent model.
Splitting the sample of the PSID between those holding equities and those not holding,
they find that the Euler equation holds more consistently in the stockholder sample than
in the non-stockholder sample. Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner (1997) make the same type
of investigation using U.K. microeconomic data. These estimation results call for
theoretical models with a disproportionate allocation of aggregate shocks.
D. Evidence from International Finance
When agent i is interchanged with country i, all implications of the above framework
can be immediately carried over to the context of international finance. The equality of
consumption growth among consumers is now equivalent to the consumption corre-
lation among countries, while a lack of diversification of household financial portfolios
now corresponds to a preference for home equity over foreign equity. According to
Hayashi et al. (1996), indeed, the earliest test of risk-sharing due to Leme (1984) was
in the context of the cross-country comparison of consumption growth. 
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) document a number of discrepancies
between theory and data for domestic and international aspects of business cycles.
The most striking discrepancy in regard to international risk-sharing is a lack of con-
sumption correlation across countries. According to Obstfeld (1994) and van
Wincoop (1994), a lack of consumption correlation across countries implies a poten-
tial risk-sharing opportunity, and all countries can reap large welfare gains from
international risk-sharing.
12 In other words, arbitrage opportunities are not exploited
in international markets. In the literature, the above discrepancy is often called the
consumption correlation puzzle.
French and Poterba (1991) first document a preference of investors for home
equity over foreign equity in stock markets. Tesar and Werner (1995) argue that there
is a strong home bias in national investment portfolios despite the potential gain
from international diversification. In the literature, the above phenomenon is called
the home bias puzzle.
13 The consumption correlation puzzle and the home bias 
puzzle jointly indicate that there is potential room for country-specific shocks to be
shared more effectively in international stock and insurance markets.
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12. In contrast, as discussed in Chapter IV, Tesar (1995) argues that the gain from international risk-sharing is not
significantly different from zero.
13. Lewis (1995) surveys the literature on the home bias puzzle.E. Studies Based on Japanese Data
To conclude this chapter, we briefly review empirical studies based on Japanese data.
First of all, let us examine tests of capital asset pricing models (CAPM) using aggre-
gate data. Contrary to the result of the case of the United States, the forecast error of
the Euler equation for stock returns does not contain predictable components. Using
monthly data, Hamori (1992) and Hori (1996) pass the over-identification test.
Their estimation, however, finds risk-neutrality or near risk-neutral behavior; there-
fore, stochastic discount factors (equivalent to the IMRS) play a rather limited role in
accounting for predictable components of stock returns. Using semiannual data, on
the other hand, Nakano and Saito (1998) find that consumers are indeed risk averse
(the degree of RRA is about 2.5).
The above results favorable for the CAPM do not necessarily support the 
representative agent framework. Nakano and Saito (1998) show that, allowing for 
the generalization of stochastic discount factors, any single stochastic discount factor
is not able to explain multiple asset returns consistently. In addition, Hori (1996) 
finds that the unconditional moments of stochastic discount factors are outside 
the Hansen-Jagannathan region, thereby indicating that the representative agent 
framework is rejected profoundly by Japanese markets data.
There are only a few papers based on Japanese panel data. Hayashi (1985b) uses
the 1982 Survey of Family Consumption compiled by the Economic Planning
Agency, in which families are interviewed every three months for one year, and 
tests the permanent income hypothesis with due consideration for liquidity 
constraints. He finds that the permanent income hypothesis (the self-insurance
hypothesis) applies to a large fraction of the population, and that only 15 percent of
the population are liquidity-constrained.
Kohara (1997) conducts a test of full insurance using the 1993 and 1994 Japanese
Panel Surveys of Consumption (JPSC) compiled by the Institute of Household
Economy. Like the PSID, the JPSC surveys the same households once a year. In
addition, Ohtake and Saito (1998b) test full insurance exploiting the panel data
structure of the 1995 Family Income and Expenditure Survey conducted by the
Statistics Bureau of the Japanese government. This survey interviews the same house-
holds every month for half a year. Both Kohara (1997) and Ohtake and Saito
(1998b) strongly reject the full insurance hypothesis.
Ohtake and Saito (1998a) conduct the Deaton and Paxson (1994) type 
examination using the cross-sectional household data called the National Survey 
on Family Income and Expenditure compiled by the Statistics Bureau of the 
Japanese government. As mentioned before, they find that consumption inequality
grows quickly with age within a fixed cohort, thereby suggesting that permanent
idiosyncratic shocks remain uninsured in the economy.
In Japan, the examination on regional risk-sharing is particularly interesting
because the fiscal system is expected to serve as a risk-sharing scheme by transferring
resources among prefectures. Using prefectural data, van Wincoop (1995) 
tests whether risks are shared effectively among regions, and finds quite low 
consumption correlations among prefectures. His finding suggests that prefectures
are still subject to uninsured region-specific shocks despite the public regional 
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stock ownership in Japan. They find that foreign investors display some patterns of
preferences for Japanese stocks, which are not necessarily consistent with the optimal
portfolio choice.
III. Theoretical Models
In the past decade, theoretical models have been constructed to account for 
the observations discussed in the previous chapter, that is, asset pricing anomalies 
and heterogeneous consumption behavior. In particular, the literature has emphasized
three aspects: incomplete insurance, endogenous constraints in dynamic models, 
and disproportionate allocation of aggregate shocks. This chapter surveys the recent
theoretical development model by model.
14
A. Incomplete Insurance
Let us begin with the case where any claims contingent on person-specific events are
not available in markets, while claims contingent on macroeconomic events are
traded without any frictions in financial markets. Restating this, insurance markets
themselves are missing, but consumers are allowed to self-insure person-specific
shocks by freely having access to financial markets.
While the absence of insurance markets is often justified by either moral hazard,
adverse selection, or limited commitment, missing insurance is treated as an 
exogenous constraint for the moment. Issues related to endogenous constraints 
will be discussed in the next section. In what follows, what is implied by an 
“idiosyncratic shock” is a shock to which the law of large numbers is applicable at 
the aggregate level.
In the literature, a dynamic model with both incomplete insurance and liquidity
constraints was initiated by Bewley (1986). His model considers only idiosyncratic
shocks abstracting aggregate shocks, and suggests that a risk-free rate lies below 
the rate of time preference. Hence, his finding has already suggested that this 
line of research has a chance to resolve at least the risk-free rate puzzle. More recent
theoretical work has attempted to evaluate the extent to which the risk-free rate 
puzzle is resolved as well as to analyze the possibility of resolving the risk premium
puzzle by introducing aggregate shocks.
1. Transitory shocks versus permanent shocks
How the prediction of this class of models differs from that of the standard represen-
tative agent framework depends mainly on how much consumers can self-insure 
idiosyncratic shocks. If the self-insurance ability is inadequate, then the theoretical
prediction differs substantially between the two models. Otherwise, there may be 
little difference. The recent literature finds that the self-insurance ability relies on the
nature of idiosyncratic shocks on individual endowment.
Telmer (1993), Lucas (1994), and Heaton and Lucas (1992) show that transitory
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14. Heaton and Lucas (1995) survey the literature of asset pricing models with market imperfections.idiosyncratic shocks are self-insured almost perfectly, and that models with 
incomplete insurance cannot generate any predictions that improve on what the 
representative agent framework predicts. Constantinides and Duffie (1996), on the
other hand, demonstrate that agents are not able to effectively self-insure permanent
idiosyncratic shocks on individual endowment. Saito (1998a) presents a similar case
using a continuous-time asset pricing model. As discussed below, the models with
permanent idiosyncratic shocks differ from the representative agent models in several
respects. Constructing a two-period model, Weil (1992) also presents a case in which
incomplete insurance matters in asset pricing; his model yields predictions similar to
the above dynamic models with permanent shocks.
The main reason why theoretical predictions depend on whether idiosyncratic
shocks on individual endowment are transitory or permanent is summarized as 
follows. In the case of transitory shocks, in response to negative shocks, consumers
can borrow from markets or draw down assets without any drop in consumption
because such shocks have negligible impact on the present value of lifetime income.
Similarly, consumers receiving positive shocks lend to markets instead of raising 
consumption because of very little effect on human capital. Such borrowing and
lending recovers an equilibrium in financial markets. Transitory idiosyncratic shocks,
therefore, do not have any significant impact on the individual consumption plan,
and consumers still behave alike under adequate self-insurance.
In the case of permanent shocks, on the other hand, idiosyncratic shocks have a
substantial impact on individual human capital, and individuals change current 
consumption in response to realized idiosyncratic shocks instead of keeping 
consumption intact by means of financial trading;
15 positive (negative) shocks raise
(lower) consumption. Hence, consumers are subject to uninsured shocks and behave
differently. Exposure to uninsurable shocks triggers precautionary saving on the side
of individual consumers. This impact on saving brings about immediate effects on
asset pricing on the one hand, and on capital accumulation and economic growth on
the other. We first review the asset pricing implication of incomplete insurance, while
the prediction for capital accumulation and economic growth is examined later in
Chapter IV.
Precautionary savings triggered by permanent shocks generate overall demand 
for assets, thereby lowering asset returns. For this reason, the Euler equation (4) does
not hold at the macroeconomic level (notice that equation [10] still holds at the 
individual level under the self-insurance hypothesis). As Constantinides and Duffie
(1996) and Saito (1998a) show, the left-hand side of equation (4) is less than one: 
1      u' ( C(t +1))     ——Et R(t, t +1)———— —  < 1.
1 + r   ( u' ( C(t))   )
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15. Constantinides and Duffie (1996), Saito (1998a), Weil (1992), and others yield an equilibrium without 
any financial trading. Krusell and Smith (1994) demonstrate that this kind of no-trading outcome generates
unrealistic distributions of asset holdings. The no-trading outcome may be interpreted as an analytically tractable
equilibrium.The above-mentioned two papers parameterize the difference between both sides of
the above inequality under the assumption of stochastic processes.
As mentioned before, the above prediction for lower asset returns is suggestive 
for the risk-free rate puzzle, or the question of why risk-free rates are so low. 
Saito (1998a) predicts a reasonable magnitude of a risk-free rate under plausible 
parameters. This class of models is, however, somewhat mixed in resolving the equity
premium puzzle. Grossman and Shiller (1982) have already shown that equity 
premia (R(t, t + 1) – Rf(t, t + 1), where Rf is a risk-free rate) are orthogonal to 
the IMRS on the average at the aggregate level even in the presence of uninsured
idiosyncratic shocks, assuming the diffusion process for individual consumption.
That is,
1                                        u' ( C(t +1))     ——Et  (R(t, t +1)– Rf(t, t +1))———— — = 0.
1 + r   ( u' ( C(t))   )
The above Euler equation implication is exactly identical to that of the representa-
tive agent framework; therefore, there is no impact of incomplete insurance on risk
premia in this case. Saito (1998a) emphasizes the above result.
Weil (1992), however, finds that larger equity premia are generated in his model.
Constantinides and Duffie (1996), allowing for the stochastic volatility for idiosyn-
cratic shocks, present the case where the left-hand side of the above Euler equation 
is not equal to zero. In particular, they find that it is positive, and equity premia 
are larger in incomplete insurance than in complete markets when the variance of
idiosyncratic shocks is counter-cyclical. Their finding corresponds to the implication
from the two-period model of Mankiw (1986). In addition, Saito (1998b) demon-
strates that, if the preference is switched from the CRRA to the non-expected utility
(due to Epstein and Zin [1989]), then equity premia are not orthogonal to the IMRS
on average even at the aggregate level, thereby showing the effect on equity premia of
the interaction between non-expected utility and incomplete insurance.
In summary, the implication for the equity premium puzzle may depend on either
underlying stochastic processes of idiosyncratic shocks or preference functional
forms. As will be discussed in Chapter IV, the effect of incomplete insurance on
equity premia is also closely related to the evaluation of the cost of business cycles.
2. Liquidity constraints, short-sales constraints, and transaction costs
The lesson from the previous subsection is that, if idiosyncratic shocks on individual
endowment are transitory, then these shocks are effectively smoothed by self-insurance;
the asset pricing implication is similar to that predicted in the representative agent frame-
work. This reasoning implies that, once market frictions such as liquidity constraints,
short-sales constraints, and transaction costs limit the self-insurance ability, there may be
a reasonable improvement in prediction even under transitory idiosyncratic shocks.
When market frictions are introduced into asset pricing models, the Euler 
equation (10) no longer holds at the individual level. Consequently, tight theoretical
restrictions are lost immediately, models may not be analytically tractable, and no
closed-form solution may be available. For this reason, the research works in this
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Heaton and Lucas (1992, 1996), Huggett (1993), Krusell and Smith (1994), Lucas
(1994), and Telmer (1993)—adopt sophisticated numerical calculation techniques.
Both high-quality personal computers and flexible program codes enable researchers
to use such sophisticated techniques.
Lucas (1994) and Telmer (1993) demonstrate that mild borrowing and short-sales
constraints have little impact on the self-insurance ability, and that consumers are still
able to effectively smooth transitory idiosyncratic shocks. According to their further
simulation, a reasonable prediction of the equity premium requires both strong
degrees of these constraints and persistency of idiosyncratic shocks.
In regard to transaction costs, Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) show that liquidity
premia over returns on costlessly transacted assets are influenced by bid-ask spreads
and the transaction probability; their model obtains non-negligible premia from 
simulating the transaction probability with observed bid-ask spreads. Heaton and
Lucas (1996) decompose the effect of transaction costs on equity premia into two
components; a direct effect due to transaction margins and an indirect effect due 
to an increase in individual consumption volatility; the latter effect corresponds 
to that due to a reduced ability of self-insurance. They find that the direct effect
dominates, and that the model predicts a sizable equity premium only if transaction
margins are large.
B. Endogenous Constraints in Dynamic Models
Both the frequent empirical rejection of the full insurance hypothesis and the 
reasonable theoretical effect brought about by incomplete insurance as exogenous 
constraints raise a more fundamental question: why are markets incomplete? These
two fundamental factors may yield similar empirical implications but suggest 
different normative implications. Hence, theorizing incomplete insurance from first
principles is necessary for writing proper policy recommendations. Insurance markets
may break down due to the following fundamental factors: adverse selection, moral
hazard, and limited commitment. This section considers the recent development 
of dynamic models where market incompleteness emerges endogenously because of
either of the latter two factors.
1. Informationally constrained insurance contract
Consider the case where the individual income is subject to idiosyncratic shocks 
but such shocks are not observable (verifiable). In this case, any insurance contract
contingent on the report of the insured as to his/her income may be subject to the
problem of moral hazard; the insured has an incentive to underreport income to
receive compensation. As discussed in the previous section, individuals are able to
insure income fluctuation to some extent by lending and borrowing. Townsend
(1982), however, points out that there are efficient incentive-compatible schemes
which can dominate the self-insurance by a simple loan contract. Green (1987),
Thomas and Worrall (1990), and others explore the possibility of such efficient
insurance contracts using the dynamic programming approach.
A vital idea of their model is that a contract is conditioned not only on the 
current report of income but also on the history of the past reports. Given this 
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conditioning, an insurance contract can penalize the insured who report low 
income by lowering their future compensation, and it can promise those reporting
high income that they will receive more compensation in future periods. As a 
result, such a scheme can solve the problem of incentive compatibility. Green 
and Oh (1991) examine the empirical implication for the IMRS of this kind of 
informationally constrained efficient contract, and compare it with that of the 
permanent income hypothesis (the self-insurance hypothesis) and models with 
liquidity constraints. Atkeson and Lucas (1992) discuss the above efficient contract 
in a general equilibrium setup.
16 Phelan (1994) introduces aggregate shocks into the
setup of the informationally constrained efficient contract.
The analytical result has been so far available for the case of independently and
identically distributed idiosyncratic shocks (i.i.d. shocks or purely transitory shocks)
with the CARA preference. As discussed in the previous section, self-insurance works
quite effectively for insuring transitory shocks. Therefore, the improvement of the
above efficient contract over self-insurance may be marginal in terms of efficiency
gains, and empirical implications for the consumption allocation may not differ 
substantially between the two. If the efficient insurance scheme allows for persistent
or permanent idiosyncratic shocks, the empirical implications of this class of models
are expected to be differentiated from those of the self-insurance hypothesis.
2. Self-enforcing insurance contract
Another reason for the absence of full insurance is limited commitment. In the 
complete market paradigm, consumers are assumed to commit themselves to any
contract forever, once they agree upon it at time 0. It may be, however, next 
to impossible to enforce initial contracts on consumers perfectly even under a 
sophisticated legal system; consumers always have an incentive to renege upon initial
contracts. Given such limited commitment, a contract should be made in such a 
way that there is no incentive to breach it. In other words, any contract should be
self-enforcing. The consumption allocation may differ between the case with and
without self-enforcing constraints.
Hayashi (1996) argues that limited commitment is more responsible for the
absence of full insurance than moral hazard by pointing out that a fraction of aggregate
consumption is often correlated with publicly observable variables; for example,
Attanasio and Davis (1996) find that the average consumption of high school graduates
moved together with their average real wage in the 1980s. In principle, such a fluctua-
tion specific to a group of consumers can be reduced by having a contract contingent on
publicly observable variables, and it is hard to imagine that the problem of moral
hazard keeps such a contract from being made in markets.
Following the theoretical framework of Thomas and Worrall (1988), Hayashi
(1996) presents a simple model of consumption allocation with self-enforcing constraints.
In this model, the self-insurance opportunity is ruled out by assumption, and con-
sequently consumers can only rely on the self-enforcing insurance contract to insure 
idiosyncratic shocks. This model generates the following empirical implication.
16. Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), and others do not take into consideration macroeconomic resource
constraints; consequently, their analysis is a partial equilibrium approach.In complete markets, the Lagrange multiplier li in equation (1) is constant over
time; the constancy of li suggests that agent i commits to the contracts made at 
time 0. When a self-enforcing constraint is binding, on the other hand, the Lagrange
multiplier is adjusted.
17 Once the Lagrange multiplier is adjusted for a fraction 
of consumers, tight implications of complete markets such as equations (2) and (3)
break down immediately for the sample including constrained and unconstrained
consumers. In simulation, Hayashi (1996) finds a weak but statistically significant
correlation between individual income and consumption. Again, the empirical rele-
vance of the above implication may depend on how much the above self-enforcing
insurance improves on self-insurance in terms of efficiency gains. A reasonable 
efficiency gain justifies a serious look at the above self-enforcing insurance contract.
C. Disproportionate Allocation of Aggregate Shocks
Even in the case of complete markets, aggregate shocks are allocated disproportion-
ately among consumers. Less risk-averse consumers take more aggregate risks than
more risk-averse consumers, while attitudes toward risks may differ between the
young and the old in the overlapping generations setup. Dumas (1989), for example,
analyzes the financial trading between risk-takers (less risk-averse) and hedgers (more
risk-averse) in dynamically complete markets.
Heterogenous attitudes toward risks, however, do not necessarily have a signifi-
cant impact on the construction of representative agents. Some aggregation pro-
perties of complete markets still survive despite the heterogeneity in risk aversion 
(see Huang and Litzenberger [1988]), and heterogenous preferences may not be
responsible for the empirical failure of representative agent models.
In this section, we discuss the case where market incompleteness results in a 
disproportionate distribution of aggregate shocks among investors, and see how such
a disproportionate allocation affects the representative agent representation. In partic-
ular, to match the observation that only a fraction of the entire population holds
stocks in portfolios (see Section II.C), we are interested in the limited participation in
stock markets. While limited participation is an exogenous constraint in the models
discussed below, the exclusion from stock markets may arise due to high transaction
costs, expensive information costs, lack of adequate wealth, low educational 
backgrounds, ignorance of stock market practices, and so on. Saito (1995) and 
Basak and Cuoco (1998) present analytical models with limited participation as
exogenous constraints.
In Saito (1995), the stockholders satisfy the Euler equation with respect to 
both stock returns (Rs(t, t + 1)) and safe bond returns (Rf(t, t + 1)), while the non-
stockholders satisfy it only with respect to safe bond returns. In this case, aggregate 
consumption only partially reflects the consumption of investors who are facing 
complete markets (the consumption of the stockholders), and the Euler equation
defined in terms of aggregate consumption is misleading. Saito (1995) shows that the
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17. In complete markets, a planner assigns an inverse of the Lagrange multiplier for individual budgets as a weight 
for individual utility (see Huang and Litzenberger [1988]). Stated precisely, the inverse of the Lagrange multiplier
is adjusted in the binding case, since the model of Hayashi (1996) is constructed as the problem of a planner.Euler equation holds for neither stock returns nor safe bond returns at the aggregate level.
More precisely, the Euler inequalities hold at the aggregate level as follows: 
1                       u' ( C(t +1))     ——Et Rf(t, t +1)———— —  < 0,
1 + r   ( u' ( C(t))   )
and 
1                       u' ( C(t + 1))     ——Et   (Rs(t, t +1) – Rf(t, t + 1))———— —  > 0.
1 + r   ( u' ( C(t))   )
A brief explanation of the above inequalities is offered as follows. First, the 
non-stockholders invest their entire wealth in safe bonds due to participation 
constraints, and they create more demand for safe assets in this case than in the 
case without any participation constraints (the case of complete markets).
Consequently, risk-free returns decline, and the former inequality obtains. Second,
the non-stockholders cannot have access to stock markets, and their Euler equation
with respect to excess returns on equities does not hold.
18 The latter inequality at the
aggregate level reflects the failure of the Euler equation for the non-stockholders.
These Euler inequalities imply that a risk-free rate is lower and an equity 
premium is larger in the case of limited participation than in complete markets. 
The greater the wealth (the wealth held by the non-stockholders) that is excluded
from stock markets, the more prominent the degree of the above two inequalities.
Restating this, the asset pricing of this model depends on the wealth distribution
between the stockholders and the non-stockholders. In addition, under the above
setup, the forecast error of the Euler equation defined in terms of aggregate consump-
tion has predictable components which are pro-cyclical in the equation for risk-free
rates and counter-cyclical in the equation for equity premia. These predictions in
regard to the Euler equations are broadly consistent with the empirical finding 
discussed in Chapter II.
Devereux and Saito (1996) apply a similar idea to a two-country model.
19 In their
model, the wealth of one country is excluded from the stock market of the other
country, and only non-contingent claims (risk-free assets) are traded between the two
countries. As in Saito (1995), the return in the international bond market changes
over time depending on the cross-country wealth distribution.
Among the above models of Saito (1995), Basak and Cuoco (1998), and
Devereux and Saito (1996), the wealth distribution between heterogenous agents
changes in response to aggregate shocks (or country-specific shocks), and asset 
pricing depends on the evolving wealth distribution; the dependence of asset pricing
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18. Notice that the Euler equation with respect to excess returns holds for the consumers in the case of Grossman
and Shiller (1982). The reason for this is that, in their case, insurance for idiosyncratic shocks is not available, but
consumers are still able to have access to any financial assets including securities.
19. Baxter and Crucini (1995) construct a similar two-country model in discrete time, and solve it numerically.on wealth distribution never appears in representative agent models. Because of this
feature, tracing the changing wealth distribution is fairly important for characterizing
the dynamics of asset pricing. Saito (1997) presents a convenient analytical tool to
track the evolution of wealth distribution in a continuous-time setup.
IV. Welfare Implications
The theoretical research into incomplete markets discussed in the previous chapter
triggers a reassessment of welfare implications for dynamic resource allocation. In
particular, business cycles, capital accumulation, economic growth, and international
risk-sharing have been evaluated in terms of efficiency in the context of incomplete
markets. This chapter briefly surveys the theoretical research in regard to the welfare
evaluation of dynamic allocation.
A. Costs of Business Cycles
Lucas (1987) presents a provocative argument that the cost of business cycles is
extremely small, and that welfare gains from eliminating the fluctuation of aggregate
consumption is almost negligible. He evaluates the welfare cost of business cycles
using representative agent models. The literature on incomplete markets reconsiders
this striking argument from the perspective of asset pricing.
The evaluation of costs of business cycles is indeed intimately connected with the 
pricing of aggregate risks; business cycles are costly for consumers who demand a
large risk premium in exchange for taking aggregate risks. Accordingly, the plausibility
of the representative agent framework for evaluating the cost of business cycles is
closely related to that for pricing aggregate risks. Significant doubt about representative
agent models as asset pricing models immediately raises a serious question as to how 
effective they are for evaluating costs caused by aggregate fluctuations.
Campbell and Cochrane (1995) build a representative agent model with habit
formation such that large equity premia may be yielded. They show that the implied
cost of business cycles in their model is much higher than that calculated by Lucas
(1987). Their finding indicates that models able to account for the equity premium
puzzle may bring about the prediction of costly business cycles.
As discussed in Chapter III, models of incomplete insurance with borrowing 
constraints may yield a reasonable magnitude of equity premia. Given a close 
connection between asset pricing and welfare evaluation, the welfare assessment of
business cycles may be sensitive to whether markets are complete or incomplete.
Imrohoroglu (1989) demonstrates that the more severe the binding of the borrowing
constraints, the larger the cost of business cycles. Adopting the framework of
Constantinides and Duffie (1996), Heaton (1994) finds both large equity premia
and costly business cycles in the case where the variance of permanent idiosyncratic
shocks is counter-cyclical. These models suggest that those who fail to diversify 
idiosyncratic shocks tend to evaluate the cost of business cycles highly. In other
words, the cost of business cycles may be larger in incomplete markets than in 
complete markets.
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Atkeson and Phelan (1994) challenge the above view. Using a simple model 
of employment risk, they present the case where, in reaction to the reduction 
in aggregate fluctuations, economic agents choose to face more idiosyncratic 
employment risk. Restating this case, in spite of reducing aggregate risk by economic
policy, the total amount of risk faced by individual agents is almost the same 
as before. Given this endogenous determination of idiosyncratic risk, the cost of 
business cycles is smaller in complete markets where idiosyncratic shocks are insured
than in incomplete markets where idiosyncratic shocks remain uninsured. If it is the
case, the welfare evaluation based on representative agent models puts the least
upper-bound on the cost and basically supports the methodology of Lucas (1987).
The plausibility of the above Atkeson and Phelan model must be examined by 
empirical research on how idiosyncratic risk responds to aggregate risk.
B. Welfare Assessment of Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth
As mentioned before, incomplete insurance usually induces precautionary savings.
20
Such precautionary savings affect capital accumulation in neoclassical growth models,
and on economic growth in endogenous growth models. Given the welfare impact 
of market incompleteness, some studies explore a theoretical relationship among
incompleteness, welfare, and economic growth (or capital accumulation). A welfare
assessment of capital accumulation and economic growth often differs substantially
between complete and incomplete markets.
1. Neoclassical growth
In the context of neoclassical growth models without any aggregate shocks, following
Bewley (1986), Aiyagari (1995) demonstrates that net interest rates (net-of-depreciation
interest rates) are lower than the rate of time preference when income insurance is incom-
plete. Aggregate physical capital is, therefore, over-accumulated in the sense that the level
of capital is above the modified golden rule. In this case, the taxation of capital
income prevents the over-accumulation of capital, thereby raising economic welfare.
Restating this, the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive in the Bewley-type 
stationary economy. The above result is strikingly in contrast with Chamley (1986), where
the long-run optimal tax rate on capital income is zero in full insurance economies.
2. Endogenous growth
The most important virtue of endogenous growth models is that, unlike in neo-
classical growth, economic growth reflects not only exogenous technological factors
but also other factors including preference, innovation processes, government policy,
and market structure. In the literature, market incompleteness has been regarded as
one of the most responsible factors. In particular, researchers are interested in how
financial development affects economic growth. Here, financial development is
defined as a process in which financial markets are being completed.
For example, Devereux and Smith (1994), Obstfeld (1994), and Jitsuchon and
Saito (1995) present endogenous growth models with incompleteness as exogenous
constraints. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) introduce financial intermediation into an
endogenous growth model, while Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Saint-Paul
20. A theoretical characterization of precautionary savings is given by Kimball (1990) and others.(1992) construct models where economic growth and financial development are
jointly determined.
21
As summarized in Pagano (1993), there are two opposite effects of financial 
development on economic growth among the above models. As a consequence of 
risk diversification, on the one hand, physical capital may be invested on riskier but 
more productive opportunities. Savings may, on the other hand, decline due to
weaker precautionary motives. The former effect enhances economic growth, while the
latter lowers it. Which effect dominates depends on underlying structural parameters.
The following example illuminates how the above opposite effects work. In




h E— — = e(ERf(t) – r)+— — — — ,
C 2  
where e implies the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, g is the degree of relative
risk aversion, s
2
h is the variance of uninsured permanent shocks, r is the rate of time
preference, and ERf(t) is the average risk-free rate. Notice that consumption growth
is equal to economic growth in endogenous growth models. 
This equation implies that, given asset returns (ERf(t)), the economy grows faster in
the presence of uninsured idiosyncratic shocks than in the absence of such shocks. The
main reason for this is that uninsured idiosyncratic shocks motivate precautionary
savings and promote capital accumulation. Indeed, the coefficient on the uninsured 
component in the second term (g + ge) implies the degree of relative prudence
defined in the non-expected utility (see Kimball and Weil [1990]).
In the above equation, the first term of the right-hand side corresponds to the
standard Ak-type endogenous growth model (see Rebelo [1991]), while the second
term represents the precautionary saving motive. When financial development 
provides risk-diversification opportunities, thereby lowering s
2
h, ERf(t) in the first
term increases, while the second term decreases due to less precautionary savings.
Jitsuchon and Saito (1995) show that the latter effect dominates when g is greater
than one. In a related context, Jappelli and Pagano (1994) introduce liquidity con-
straints into an endogenous growth model. When credit markets are developed in
their model, less binding constraints may lead to lower saving rates, thereby reducing
economic growth.
The above predictions all suggest that financial development may have a negative
effect on growth. In most cases, on the other hand, completing financial markets
improves economic welfare. While financial markets are being developed, therefore,
welfare and growth may move in an opposite direction. In other words, faster 
growth may not bring about higher welfare. Interestingly enough, Jappelli and
Pagano (1994) point out that a deep interest of the public in high economic growth
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21. Endogenizing incompleteness from the problem of moral hazard, Tsiddon (1992) and Aghion and Bolton (1997)
present models where capital accumulation and financial development are jointly determined.sometimes works to repress insurance and consumer credit markets in several ways;
such repression of financial markets maintains economic growth at the expense of
social welfare.
C. Welfare Gains from International Risk-Sharing
As discussed in Section II.D, the consumption correlation puzzle indicates poor risk-
sharing among countries, while the home bias puzzle suggests that there is a distinct
lack of international diversification in financial markets.
Obstfeld (1994) and van Wincoop (1994) indeed demonstrate that each country
could receive substantial gains from international risk-sharing. In their welfare 
calculation, they compare the outcome of perfectly complete international markets
with that of assuming each country as an autarkic economy. Since there is an obvious
welfare gain from a shift from autarky to full insurance, the only issue is the size of
the gain from full insurance.
22
Such a simple welfare comparison, however, may involve some problems. First 
of all, as repeatedly discussed so far, there is market incompleteness in a domestic
country itself. Therefore, potential opportunities for risk-sharing may exist not only
in international markets but also in domestic markets. Tesar (1995) finds that, 
allowing for self-insurance activities in each country, there are negligible gains from
international risk-sharing. She suggests that such small gains are not sufficient to 
offset transaction costs incurred in international markets, thereby justifying the lack
of global risk-sharing.
What is more fundamental, regarding complete isolation from international 
markets as the status quo seems too simple an assumption. Developed countries 
usually have at least partial access to international financial markets. In particular, it
is well known that money markets (short-term bond markets) are integrated globally.
A more accurate description should be that in the status quo countries are exposed to
some extent to international intertemporal prices.
In the above case, opening another market generally has an impact on existing
prices and generates complicated effects on welfare distribution among agents.
Opening markets, therefore, may not result in Pareto-improving; someone may 
be worse off due to market opening. Such a general equilibrium impact on welfare
distribution has been noted in the general equilibrium literature. Furthermore, Hart
(1975) and Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) present even stronger results with which
opening another market makes everyone worse off.
Using a two-country setup, Devereux and Saito (1996) compare the case 
where only non-contingent claims are traded internationally (the bond regime) with
the case where markets are globally complete (full risk-sharing). There are a debtor
country and a creditor country in the bond regime. When the international economy
shifts from the bond regime to full risk-sharing, precautionary savings in each 
country decrease as a result of diversifying country-specific shocks, thereby raising
bond returns in international markets. Consequently, a country which used to be a
debtor loses the advantage of low interest rates. For this debtor country, the regime
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22. Cole and Obstfeld (1991) present a more conservative estimate of welfare gains.shift sometimes makes the benefit of risk-sharing dominated by the cost of losing 
the opportunity of low interest rates. Devereux and Saito (1996) argue that such
potential effects of financial integration on the cross-country welfare distribution
may make some countries stick to the status quo where risk-sharing is only partial.
V. Conclusion
The research into incomplete markets has been developed to account for asset pricing
anomalies and heterogeneous consumption behavior, both of which contradict 
the predictions of the complete markets framework. This survey has reviewed such
development in empirical and theoretical respects. To conclude this survey, the
author offers two remarks on future research.
First, the literature has so far emphasized the positive aspects of incomplete 
markets models. The main reason for this is that the observed deviation from the
complete markets paradigm is fairly striking; explaining the dramatic deviation itself
has been intellectually exciting. In the future, the research emphasis may shift 
from the positive aspects to the normative aspects. A complete markets economy 
has well-known desirable welfare features. The substantial deviation from such an
economy tells us that economic agents suffer significant welfare losses. How much
are their welfare losses? How are such welfare losses remedied? Which policy results
in welfare improvement? How much does financial innovation raise welfare? How
does financial integration affect welfare distribution among concerned countries?
Theoretical models will be constructed not only to account for empirical findings but
also to answer these questions.
Second, to answer the above questions more fundamentally requires theoretical
models which are able to endogenize market incompleteness from first principles. As
discussed in Chapter III, two different endogenous constraints may yield seemingly
similar positive (empirical) predictions for asset pricing, but the choice of policy
depends on which fundamental factor underlies these constraints. Without an 
accurate understanding of the economic factors, policy makers cannot write policy
prescriptions properly.
70 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999Abel, A. B., “Asset Pricing under Habit Formation and Catching Up with the Joneses,” American
Economic Review, 80 (2), 1990, pp. 38–42.
Aghion, P., and P. Bolton, “A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development,” Review of Economic
Studies, 64 (2), 1997, pp. 151–172.
Aiyagari, S. R., “Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
109 (3), 1994, pp. 659–684.
———, “Optimal Capital Income Taxation with Incomplete Markets, Borrowing Constraints, and
Constant Discounting,” Journal of Political Economy, 103 (6), 1995, pp. 1158–1175.
———, and M. Gertler, “Asset Returns with Transaction Costs and Uninsured Individual Risk,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 27 (3), 1991, pp. 311–331.
Altonji, J. G., F. Hayashi, and L. J. Kotlikoff, “Is the Extended Family Altruistically Linked? Direct
Tests Using Micro Data,” American Economic Review, 82 (5), 1992, pp. 1177–1198.
Altug, S., and R. Miller, “Household Choices in Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 58 (3), 1990, 
pp. 543–570.
Atkeson, A., and R. E. Lucas, Jr., “On Efficient Distribution with Private Information,” Review of
Economic Studies, 59 (3), 1992, pp. 427–453.
———, and C. Phelan, “Reconsidering the Costs of Business Cycles with Incomplete Markets,” in 
S. Fischer and J. J. Rotemberg, eds. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1994, pp. 187–207,
Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1994.
Attanasio, O. P., “The Intertemporal Allocation of Consumption: Theory and Evidence,” Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 42, 1995, pp. 39–89.
———, and G. Weber, “Consumption Growth, the Interest Rate and Aggregation,” Review of
Economic Studies, 60 (3), 1993, pp. 631–649.
———, and S. J. Davis, “Relative Wage Movements and the Distribution of Consumption,” Journal of
Political Economy, 104 (6), 1996, pp. 1227–1262.
———, J. Banks, and S. Tanner, “Asset Ownership and Consumption Volatility,” mimeo, Stanford
University, 1997.
Avery, R. B., G. Elliehausen, and A. B. Kennickell, “Measuring Wealth with Survey Data: An
Evaluation of the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances,” Review of Income and Wealth, 34 (14),
1988, pp. 339–369.
Backus, D. K., P. J. Kehoe, and F. Kydland, “International Real Business Cycles,” Journal of Political
Economy, 100 (4), 1992, pp. 745–775.
Basak, S., and D. Cuoco, “An Equilibrium Model with Restricted Stock Market Participation,” Review
of Financial Studies, 11 (2), 1998, pp. 309–341.
Baxter, M., and M. Crucini, “Business Cycles and the Asset Market Structure of Foreign Trade,”
International Economic Review, 36 (4), 1995, pp. 821–854.
Bencivenga, V. R., and B. D. Smith, “Financial Intermediation and Endogenous Growth,” Review of
Economic Studies, 58 (2), 1991, pp. 195–209.
Bewley, T. F., “Stationary Monetary Equilibrium with a Continuum of Independently Fluctuating
Consumers,” in W. Hildenbrand and A. Mas-Colell, eds. Contribution to Mathematical
Economics in Honor of Gerard Debreu, pp. 79–102, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1986.
Campbell, J., and J. Cochrane, “By Force of Habit: A Consumption-Based Explanation of Aggregate
Stock Market Behavior,” NBER Working Paper No. 4995, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1995.
———, and A. W. Lo, and A. C. MacKinlay, The Econometrics of Financial Markets, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1997.
Cecchetti, S. G., P. Lam, and N. Mark, “The Equity Premium and the Risk Free Rate: Matching the
Moments,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 31 (1), 1993, pp. 21–45.
Chamley, C., “Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives,”
Econometrica, 54 (3), 1986, pp. 607–622.
71
Dynamic Allocation and Pricing in Incomplete Markets
ReferencesCochrane, J. H., “A Simple Test of Consumption Insurance,” Journal of Political Economy, 99 (5),
1991, pp. 957–976.
———, and L. P. Hansen, “Asset Pricing Lessons for Macroeconomists,” in O. J. Blanchard and 
S. Fischer, eds. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1992, pp. 115–165, Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1992.
Cole, H. L., and M. Obstfeld, “Commodity Trade and International Risk Sharing: How Much Do
Financial Markets Matter?” Journal of Monetary Economics, 28 (1), 1991, pp. 3–24.
Constantinides, G., “Intertemporal Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumers and without Demand
Aggregation,” Journal of Business, 55 (2), 1982, pp. 253–267.
———, “Habit Formation: A Resolution of the Equity Premium Puzzle,” Journal of Political Economy,
98 (3), 1990, pp. 519–543.
———, and D. Duffie, “Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumers,” Journal of Political Economy,
104 (2), 1996, pp. 219–240.
Deaton, A., “Saving and Liquidity Constraints,” Econometrica, 59 (5), 1991, pp. 1221–1248.
———, Understanding Consumption, Clarendon Lectures in Economics, Oxford, New York, Toronto,
and Melbourne: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1992.
———, and C. Paxson, “Intertemporal Choice and Inequality,” Journal of Political Economy, 102 (3),
1994, pp. 437–467.
Den Haan, W. J., “Heterogeneity, Aggregate Uncertainty and the Short-Term Interest Rate,” Journal of
Business and Economic Statistics, 14 (4), 1996, pp. 399–411.
Devereux, M. B., and G. Smith, “International Risk Sharing and Economic Growth,” International
Economic Review, 35 (3), 1994, pp. 535–550.
———, and M. Saito, “Growth and Risk-Sharing with Incomplete International Assets Markets,”
Journal of International Economics, 42 (3/4), 1996, pp. 453–481.
Duffie, D., and K. J. Singleton, “Simulated Moments Estimation of Markov Models of Asset Prices,”
Econometrica, 61 (4), 1993, pp. 929–952.
Dumas, B., “Two-Person Dynamic Equilibrium in the Capital Market,” Review of Financial Studies, 
2 (2), 1989, pp. 157–188.
Epstein, L. G., and S. E. Zin, “Substitution, Risk Aversion and the Temporal Behavior of Consumption
and Asset Returns: A Theoretical Framework,” Econometrica, 57 (4), 1989, pp. 937–969.
———, and ———, “Substitution, Risk Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior of Consumption and
Asset Returns: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Political Economy, 99 (2), 1991, pp. 263–286.
Ferson, W. E., and G. M. Constantinides, “Habit Persistence and Durability in Aggregate
Consumption: Empirical Tests,” Journal of Financial Economics, 29 (2), 1991, pp. 199–240.
French, K. R., and J. M. Poterba, “Investor Diversification and International Equity Markets,”
American Economic Review, 81 (2), 1991, pp. 222–226.
Green, E. J., “Lending and the Smoothing of Uninsurable Income,” in E. C. Prescott and N. Wallace,
eds. Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade, Minnesota Studies in Macroeconomics
Series, Vol. 1, pp. 3–25, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
———, and S. N. Oh, “Contracts, Constraints and Consumption,” Review of Economic Studies, 58 (5),
1991, pp. 883–899.
Greenwood, G. J., and B. Jovanovic, “Financial Development, Growth, and the Distribution of
Income,”  Journal of Political Economy, 98 (5), 1990, pp. 1076–1107.
Grossman, S. J., and R. J. Shiller, “Consumption Correlatedness and Risk Measurement in Economies
with Non-Traded Assets and Heterogeneous Information,” Journal of Financial Economics, 
10 (2), 1982, pp. 195–210.
Hall, R. E., “Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis: Theory and
Evidence,” Journal of Political Economy, 86 (6), 1978, pp. 971–987.
———, “Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption,” Journal of Political Economy, 96 (2), 1988, pp.
339–357.
Hamori, S., “Test of C-CAPM for Japan: 1980–1988,” Economics Letters, 38 (1), 1992, pp. 67–72.
Hansen, L. P., “Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators,” Econometrica,
50 (4), 1982, pp. 1029–1054.
72 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999———, and K. J. Singleton, “Generalized Instrumental Variables Estimation of Nonlinear Rational
Expectations Models,” Econometrica, 50 (5), 1982, pp. 1269–1286.
———, and R. Jagannathan, “Implications of Security Market Data for Models of Dynamic
Economies,”  Journal of Political Economy, 99 (2), 1991, pp. 225–262.
———, J. Heaton, and E. G. J. Luttmer, “Econometric Evaluation of Asset Pricing Models,” Review of
Financial Studies, 8 (2), 1995, pp. 237–274.
Hart, O., “On the Optimality of Equilibrium When the Market Structure Is Incomplete,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 11 (3), 1975, pp. 418–443.
Hayashi, F., “The Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Consumption: A Cross-Sectional Analysis,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (1), 1985a, pp. 183–206.
———, “The Permanent Income Hypothesis and Consumption Durability: Analysis Based on Japanese
Panel Data,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (4), 1985b, pp. 1083–1113.
———, “Test for Liquidity Constraints: A Critical Survey and Some New Observations,” in T. F.
Bewley, ed. Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, Cambridge, New York, and
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
———, “Analysis of Household Saving: Past, Present, and Future,” Japanese Economic Review, 47 (1),
1996, pp. 21–33.
———, J. G. Altonji, and L. J. Kotlikoff, “Risk-Sharing between and within Families,” Econometrica,
64 (2), 1996, pp. 261–294.
He, H., and D. M. Modest, “Market Frictions and Consumption-Based Asset Pricing,” Journal of
Political Economy, 103 (1), 1995, pp. 94–117.
Heaton, J., “The Interaction between Time-Nonseparable Preferences and Time Aggregation,”
Econometrica, 61 (2), 1993, pp. 353–385.
———, “Reconsidering the Costs of Business Cycles with Incomplete Markets: Comment,” in 
S. Fischer and J. J. Rotemberg, eds. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1994, pp. 207–212,
Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1994.
———, “An Empirical Investigation of Asset Pricing with Temporally Dependent Preference
Specifications,”  Econometrica, 63 (3), 1995, pp. 681–717.
———, and D. Lucas, “The Effects of Incomplete Insurance Markets and Trading Costs in a
Consumption-Based Asset Pricing Model,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 16 (3/4),
1992, pp. 601–620.
———, and ———, “The Importance of Investor Heterogeneity and Financial Market Imperfections
for the Behavior of Asset Prices,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 42, 1995,
pp. 1–32.
———, and ———, “Evaluating the Effects of Incomplete Markets on Risk Sharing and Asset
Pricing,”  Journal of Political Economy, 104 (3), 1996, pp. 443–487.
Hori, K., “Nihon no Shisan Shijo ni Okeru Shohi-Shisan-Kakaku-Kettei Moderu no Sai-Kensho 
(C-CAPM in the Japanese Asset Market: A Reexamination),” Osaka Economic Papers, 45, 1996,
pp. 76–90 (in Japanese).
Huang, C., and R. H. Litzenberger, Foundations for Financial Economics, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science
Publishing Company, 1988.
Huggett, M., “The Risk-Free Rate in Heterogeneous-Agent Incomplete Insurance Economies,” Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 17 (5/6), 1993, pp. 953–969.
Imrohoroglu, A., “Cost of Business Cycles with Indivisibilities and Liquidity Constraints,” Journal of
Political Economy, 97 (6), 1989, pp. 1364–1383.
Jappelli, T., and M. Pagano, “Saving, Growth, and Liquidity Constraints,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 109 (1), 1994, pp. 83–109.
Jitsuchon, S., and M. Saito, “Precautionary Saving, Growth, and Welfare: A Cross-Country Study,”
University of British Columbia, Economics Department Working Paper Series 95–09, 1995.
Kang, J. K., and R. M. Stulz, “Why Is There a Home Bias? An Analysis of Foreign Portfolio Equity
Ownership in Japan,” NBER Working Paper No. 5166, National Bureau of Economic Research,
1995.
73
Dynamic Allocation and Pricing in Incomplete MarketsKimball, M. S., “Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large,” Econometrica, 58 (1), 1990, 
pp. 53–73.
———, and P. Weil, “Precautionary Saving and Consumption Smoothing across Time and
Possibilities,”  NBER Working Paper No. 3976, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1990.
Kocherlakota, N. R., “The Equity Premium: It’s Still a Puzzle,” Journal of Economic Literature, 34 (1),
1996, pp. 42–71.
Kohara, M., “Consumption Insurance in Japan: The Evidence from Individual Panel Data,” mimeo,
Osaka University, 1997.
Krusell, P., and A. A. Smith, Jr., “Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the Macroeconomy,” mimeo,
University of Pennsylvania and Carnegie Mellon University, 1994.
Leme, P., “Integration of International Capital Markets,” mimeo, University of Chicago, 1984.
Leroy, S. F., “Efficient Capital Markets and Martingales,” Journal of Economic Literature, 27 (4), 1989,
pp. 1583–1621.
Lewis, K. K., “Puzzles in International Financial Markets,” in G. Grossman and K. J. Rogoff, eds.
Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 1913–1971, Amsterdam: North-Holland,
1995.
Lucas, D., “Asset Pricing with Undiversifiable Income Risk and Short Sales Constraints: Deepening the
Equity Premium Puzzle,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 34 (3), 1994, pp. 325–358.
Lucas, R. E., Jr., “Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy,” Econometrica, 46 (6), 1978, pp. 1429–1445.
———, Models of Business Cycles, Yrjo Jahnsson Lecture Series, London and New York: Blackwell,
1987.
Luttmer, E. G. J., “Asset Pricing in Economies with Frictions,” Econometrica, 64 (6), 1996, 
pp. 1439–1467.
Mace, B. J., “Full Insurance in the Presence of Aggregate Uncertainty,” Journal of Political Economy, 
99 (5), 1991, pp. 928–956.
Mankiw, N. G., “The Equity Premium and the Concentration of Aggregate Shocks,” Journal of
Financial Economics, 17 (1), 1986, pp. 211–219.
———, and S. P. Zeldes, “The Consumption of Stockholders and Non-Stockholders,” Journal of
Financial Economics, 29 (1), 1991, pp. 97–112.
McCarthy, J., “Imperfect Insurance and Differing Propensities to Consume across Households,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 36 (2), 1995, pp. 301–327.
Mehra, R., and E. C. Prescott, “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 15 (2),
1985, pp. 145–161.
Nakano, K., and M. Saito, “Asset Pricing in Japan: A Communication,” Journal of the Japanese and
International Economies, 12 (2), 1998, pp. 151–166.
Nelson, J., “On Testing for Full Insurance Using Consumer Expenditure Survey Data: Comment,”
Journal of Political Economy, 102 (2), 1994, pp. 384–394.
Newbery, D. M. G., and J. E. Stiglitz, “Pareto Inferior Trade,” Review of Economic Studies, 51 (1),
1984, pp. 1–12.
Obstfeld, M., “Risk-Taking, Global Diversification, and Growth,” American Economic Review, 84 (5),
1994, pp. 1310–1329.
Ohtake, F., and M. Saito, “Population Aging and Consumption Inequality in Japan,” Review of Income
and Wealth, 44 (3), 1998a, pp. 361–381.
———, and ———, “A Test of Full Insurance: The Case of Japan,” mimeo, Osaka University, 1998b.
Pagano, M., “Financial Markets and Growth: An Overview,” European Economic Review, 37 (2/3),
1993, pp. 613–622.
Phelan, C., “Incentives and Aggregate Shocks,” Review of Economic Studies, 61 (4), 1994, pp. 681–700.
Rebelo, S., “Long-Run Policy Analysis and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 99 (3),
1991, pp. 500–521.
Reitz, T., “The Equity Premium: A Solution,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 22 (1), 1988, 
pp. 117–131.
Rubinstein, M., “An Aggregation Theorem for Securities Markets,” Journal of Financial Economics, 
1 (3), 1974, pp. 225–244.
74 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999Runkle, D. E., “Liquidity Constraints and the Permanent Income Hypothesis,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 27 (1), 1991, pp. 73–98.
Saint-Paul, G., “Technological Choice, Financial Markets, and Economic Development,” European
Economic Review, 36 (4), 1992, pp. 763–781.
Saito, M., “Limited Participation and Asset Pricing,” mimeo, University of British Columbia, 1995.
———, “A Note on Ergodic Distributions in Two-Agent Economies,” Journal of Mathematical
Economics, 27 (2), 1997, pp. 133–141.
———, “A Simple Model of Incomplete Insurance: The Case of Permanent Idiosyncratic Shocks,”
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 22 (5), 1998a, pp. 763–777.
———, “Incomplete Insurance and Non-Expected Utility,” Japanese Economic Review, 49 (3), 1998b,
pp. 271–283.
Singleton, K. J., “Specification and Estimation of Intertemporal Asset Pricing Models,” in G. M.
Friedman and F. H. Hahn, eds. Handbook of Monetary Economics, Vol. 1, Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1990.
Telmer, C., “Asset Pricing Puzzles and Incomplete Markets,” Journal of Finance, 48 (5), 1993, 
pp. 1803–1832.
Tesar, L. L., “Evaluating the Gains from International Risk Sharing,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series in Public Policy, 42, 1995, pp. 95–143.
———, and I. Werner, “Home Bias and High Turnover,” Journal of International Money and Finance,
14 (4), 1995, pp. 467–492.
Thomas, J., and T. Worrall, “Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies, 55 (4),
1988, pp. 541–554.
———, and ———, “Income Fluctuation and Asymmetric Information: An Example of a Repeated
Principal-Agent Problem,” Journal of Economic Theory, 51 (2), 1990, pp. 367–390.
Townsend, R. M., “Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under
Private Information,” Journal of Political Economy, 90 (6), 1982, pp. 1166–1186.
———, “Arrow-Debreu Programs as Microfoundations of Macroeconomics,” in T. F. Bewley, ed.
Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, pp. 379–428, Cambridge, New York, and
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
———, “Risk and Insurance in Village India,” Econometrica, 62 (3), 1994, pp. 539–591.
———, “Consumption Insurance: An Evaluation of Risk-Bearing Systems in Low-Income
Economies,”  Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (3), 1995, pp. 83–102.
Tsiddon, D., “A Moral Hazard Trap to Growth,” International Economic Review, 33 (2), 1992, 
pp. 299–321.
van Wincoop, E., “Welfare Gains from International Risksharing,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 
34 (2), 1994, pp. 175–200.
———, “Regional Risksharing,” European Economic Review, 39 (8), 1995, pp. 1545–1567.
Weil, P., “The Equity Premium Puzzle and the Risk-Free Rate Puzzle,” Journal of Monetary Economics,
24 (3), 1989, pp. 401–421.
———, “Equilibrium Asset Prices with Undiversifiable Labor Income Risk,” Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 16 (3/4), 1992, pp. 769–790.
Wilson, R., “The Theory of Syndicates,” Econometrica, 36 (1), 1968, pp. 119–131.
Zeldes, S. P., “Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of
Political Economy, 97 (2), 1989a, pp. 305–346.
———, “Optimal Consumption with Stochastic Income: Deviations from Certainty Equivalence,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (2), 1989b, pp. 275–298.
75
Dynamic Allocation and Pricing in Incomplete Markets76 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1999